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COMMENTARY
Venue In Civil Actions
DAVID S.

CLARK*

Introduction
Both jurisdiction and venue relate to the question of the proper court
in which plaintiff may bring an action. Jurisdiction, on the one hand,
deals with the power of a particular court to adjudicate a claim and
eventually render a judgment binding on the parties. Venue, on the
other hand, concerns the place or locality where judicial authority may
be exercised.' This would be the particular county or counties in state
judicial systems or specified judicial districts within the federal system
where an action might be correctly brought. The dominant rationale
for venue provisions is to promote the convenience of litigants and
witnesses.2
This article describes and analyzes the venue scheme for civil actions
in Oklahoma. Oklahoma, as with most states, has a large number of
statutory provisions regulating venue.' Likewise, there is an "inordinate"
number of federal venue statutes.4 Because federal courts defer to state
norms when the lawsuit is a local action, the analysis of state provisions
is particularly important.' In both Oklahoma and the federal system,
@1983 David S. Clark
* A.B., 1966; J.D., 1969; J.S.M., 1972, Stanford University. Professor of Law, University
of Tulsa College of Law.
A shorter version of this article appears in D. CLARK, OKLAHOMA CIVuI PRErRIAL PROCEDURE:
THm SUMMONS, JURISDICTION AND VENUE ch. 6 (in press 1983).
The author wishes to thank Nancy G. Gourley and James J. Proszek for insightful research
assistance in the preparation of this article.-Ed.
1. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939); Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Superior Court, 368 P.2d 475, 478-79 (Okla. 1961).
2. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 560 (1967).
3. See, e.g., appendices 1 and 2, following text (Oklahoma). For a discussion of other states'
venue provisions, see generally I F. ELLIOTr, TEXAS CIvIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY
COURTs 329 (rev. ed. 1981) (Texas: "excessive number of statutory venue provisions"); 1 A.
VESTAL, IOWA PRACTICE 65-66 (1974) (Iowa); 2 B. WITriN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 869-73 (2d
ed. 1970) (California); Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosisand ProposedCure, 49 MICH. L. REV.
307, 308-09 (1951) (in general); Comment, Groundsfor Venue in Arkansas-A Survey, 25 ARK.
L. REv. 468, 485-86 (1972) (Arkansas); Comment, Venue Problems in Wisconsin, 56 MARQ.
L. REv. 87, 116-17 (1972) (Wisconsin).
4. 15 C. WRIor, A. MILmR & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRAC11CE AND PROCEDURE § 3804,
at 17 (1976).
5. Id. § 3822, at 130.
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moreover, there are historical venue artifacts which today seem to serve
no important policy. 6 These will be discussed where appropriate.
Part I of the article discusses the basic venue rule in Oklahoma for
suits involving an individual defendant. This rule focuses on the county where the defendant resides,7 but also includes a county where he
may be served process. Part II next develops the local action rule and
its applicability to cases involving real property. In Part III special
norms related to particular transitory actions are described and in Part
IV the emphasis is on particular defendants in transitory actions (including nonresidents, corporations, and government entities). Suits with
multiple claims and defendants add complexity to an analysis of venue
provisions. These matters are covered in Part V. Finally, Part VI
discusses the desirability of permitting a change of venue under certain circumstances.
An important difference between jurisdiction and venue is that a
default judgment entered without subject matter jurisdiction or personal
jurisdiction over the defendant is void and subject to collateral attack;
the same judgment entered by a court lacking only venue is enforceable.'
Consequently, venue provisions, usually considered to be the personal
privilege of the defendant, may be waived by a defendant at an early
point in the proceedings by simple inaction. 9 Once venue provisions
are waived, a court without venue has the power to determine the merits
of the suit.'" In fact, the defendant generally can waive in advance
6. See id. § 3802, at 7-8 (wider choice of venue in federal courts for diversity cases than
in federal question cases). See infra text accompanying notes 31-33 (Oklahoma venue permitted
in the county where a defendant may be summoned). Cf. Guittard, Alice in Venue Land, 32
BAYLOR L. REv. 561, 561-63 (1980) (Texas venue).
7. Most states follow this rule. See, e.g., ELtuoTr, supra note 3, at 331 (Texas: "No person
who is an inhabitant of this State shall be sued out of the county in which he has his domicile
....");VESTAL, supra note 3,at 66 (Iowa: county of defendant's residence); Glenn, Venue,
in I CALFRNIA Crvm PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 109, 117 (1977) (California: county of defendant's residence); Stevens, supra note 3, at 311 (listing 47 states that use the county where the
defendant resides as a basis for venue).
8. See, e.g., Crist v. Cosby, IIOkla. 635, 641-42, 69 P. 885, 887 (1902). See also D. CLARK,
OKLAHOMA CrvrL P

tTRIAL
PROCEDURE: TmE SUMMONS, JURISDICTION AND VENUE ch. 9, § D

(in press 1983).
9. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979). See Simpson v. Elsing,
169 Okla. 391, 37 P.2d 267 (1934). In Simpson, the court stated that a venue statute was a
"barrier for the protection of a defendant against being sued in a county other than that of
his residence .... " and that the protection is waived when the defendant "enters a general
appearance by motion, demurrer, or answer in which he invokes the power of the court for
relief on nonjurisdictional grounds." Id. at 394, 37 P.2d at 270. See also OKLA. DIST. CT. R.
3, 12 OKLA. STAT. ch. 2, app. (1981), which requires that objectioni to venue be asserted at
the same time as objections to issuance and service of summons. The objection to venue may
be filed either before the filing of any other motions or pleadings or with the first instruments
filed by the defendant. However, objections to venue are waived if the defendant seeks affirmative relief.
10. Hume v. Cragin, 61 Okla. 219, 220-21, 160 P. 621, 622 (1916). See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
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his objection to improper venue by agreement." Venue by consent will
be upheld where there has been arm's-length negotiation and no
compelling public policy requires rejection of the forum selected.' 2
Alternatively, if the defendant properly objects to lack of venue, a
court cannot proceed with the action." In addition, Oklahoma courts
will not exercise venue over a defendant based solely on service of
process obtained by fraud or unlawful force.' 4
In early English common law, venue was not an issue because all
actions were required to be brought in the county where the event complained of occurred." This norm-today called the local action rule-is
still in effect for some types of actions.' 6 Jurors were originally selected
for their supposed personal knowledge of the facts regarding local
disputes. Later, the jury's role changed. With the power of judges to
send a jury to any part of England, the fiction that a right of action
followed the defendant from county to county evolved, ostensibly to
satisfy the local action rule, which established venue in the county where
the claim arose. In reality, the fiction allowed the case to be tried in
another county. The fiction, however, only applied in those suits
classified as "transitory." For "local action" suits, typically those directly affecting real property,' 7 the'claim had to be filed in the county
where the subject of the suit was located.'" This distinction between
local and transitory actions has been retained in Oklahoma. ,9 Moreover,
the local action rule in Oklahoma has been equated with a court's subject matter jurisdiction. 20 Therefore, when the local action rule applies,

II. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). Cf. 15 OKI.A. STAT. § 816
(1981) (venue is proper in a county when an agreement provides for an arbitration hearing in
that county). But see, e.g., ELLIOTT, supra note 3, at 330 (Texas); W=rrN, supra note 3, at
1254 (California). See generallyGilbert, Choice of ForumClauses in Internationaland Interstate
Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. 1 (1977).
12. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
13. See CLARK, supra note 8, at ch. 9, § A.
14. Oklahoma Journal Publ. Co. v. Coryell, 485 P.2d 1056, 1057-58 (Okla. 1971). See also
Recent Development, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 402 (1971) (discussing Oklahoma Journal). Cf. CLARK,
supra note 8, at ch. 5 § G (limits on jurisdiction).
15. For an account of the historical development of venue, see generally Blume, Place of
Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. Rnv. 1 (1949).
16. Discussed infra in text accompanying notes 43-62.
17. For example, Oklahoma statutorily requires that actions to recover real property or an
interest therein, to partition real property, to sell real property under a mortgage or lien, to
quiet title, and to recover damages for injury to land must be brought in the county in which
the subject of the action is located. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 131 (1981).
18. Developments in the Law-State-CourtJurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 980 (1960).
See Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 664 (C.C.D. Va. 1811).
19. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 139 (1981) (last sentence preserving local actions).
20. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Superior Court, 368 P.2d 475, 479, 484 (Okla. 1961). See
also Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105 (1895); 15 VRIGHT, et al., supra note 4,
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venue cannot be waived or conferred on a court by consent of the
parties. The court, in fact, may raise the issue on its own motion, even
2
on appeal. '
The preferred approach in ascertaining an appropriate venue for
litigation in Oklahoma is first to determine whether a suit is covered
by the local action rule. If it is, then the only proper venue is the county
in which the subject of the action is located. 22 If a suit is not covered
by the local action rule, then venue, under the general norm for
transitory actions, is proper in a county where the defendant resides
or may be summoned.23 Unless a suit also qualifies under other
provisions applicable to particular transitory actions, these are the
plaintiff's only options. If a suit or the defendant falls within a category
of actions or defendants covered by particularvenue provisions, the
plaintiff has a further choice of locations for proper venue. 2 If a suit
is filed in any county where venue is proper, a court cannot move the
suit to another forum simply because the latter forum is "more" proper.
However, a party may request a change of venue when a trial in the
selected county would be unfair, and the doctrine of forum non
conveniens under some circumstances may lead to a dismissal or transfer
of the case upon a defendant's motion.2"
I.

The Basic Rule: Venue in the County of Defendant's
Residence or Where Served Process

The principal rationale for venue statutes is to assure that a lawsuit
is litigated in a place convenient for the parties and witnesses. The
total venue scheme, including provisions for transferring cases, should
prevent a plaintiff from harassing a defendant by filing suit in a county
where it would be difficult for the defendant to defend.26 Difficulties
could stem from economic consideration, such as the cost of traveling
a long distance, or from tactical factors, such as the impracticability
27
of obtaining records or the testimony of witnesses.
The basic rule for transitory actions in Oklahoma supports a resident
§ 3822, at 128-29; Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 981 (majority rule). But see Fraser,
Venue Oklahoma Style, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 182, 182-83 (1970).
21. See, e.g., Harber v. McKeown, 195 Okla. 290, 291-92, 157 P.2d 753, 754-55 (1945). Contra,
Frazer, supra note 20, at 182 n.3.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 43-62.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 28-40.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 68-118.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 143-175.
26. Cf. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979) (federal system).
27. Fraser, Oklahoma Venue: Are Changes Needed?, 44 OKLA. B.A.J. q-607, q-608 (Supp.
1973).
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defendant's interest in his own convenience. 28 Section 139 of Title 12
of the Oklahoma Statutes (1981) provides in part: "Every other action
[except those covered by the local action rule or special transitory
actions] must be brought in the county in which the defendant or some
one of the defendants resides or may be summoned; . ..- 29 The county
of a defendant's residence clearly satisfies the convenience policy and
is favored by the Oklahoma Supreme Court over provisions that allow
venue in counties other than that in which defendants reside.3 0 However,
as Professor George Fraser has pointed out, permitting venue where
a defendant happens to be caught with process ("may be summoned")
satisifies no policy.3 In suits against an assignor of a note, claim, or
other debt, in fact, only the county of residence provides proper venue.3
Nevertheless, except against assignors, plaintiffs may still use this venue
that a right of action follows
provision based on the common law fiction
33
the defendant from county to county.
To maintain integrity in the judicial process, consequently, the policy
underlying judicially imposed limits on the exercise of jurisdiction, when
a defendant's presence is obtained solely by fraud or unlawful force,
should apply with equal merit when venue in a particular county is
established solely by a defendant's presence. A court should not lend
its assistance to a plaintiff who has tricked or forced a defendant to
enter a county merely to procure venue."
The adoption of Title 12, section 143 in 197511 buttresses the argument
that section 139 provides the central rule for transitory actions in
Oklahoma. For many years certain venue provisions were judicially
classified as special and others as general-with the former trumping
the latter.3 , Section 143 provides: "All venue statutes are cumulative

28. See supra note 7.
29. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 139 (1981).
30. Jones v. Brown, 516 P.2d 546, 548 (Okla. 1973) ("Exceptions which authorize bringing
of suits in a county other than that of the defendant's residence are to be strictly construed
Statutes which permit a defendant to have certain actions tried in the county where he
....
resides are remedial in nature and are to be liberally construed .... ."); Hiner v. Hugh Breeding,
Inc., 355 P.2d 549, 551 (Okla. 1960).
31. Fraser, supra note 20, at 184-85. Accord, Stevens supra note 3, at 314; Comment, 25
ARK. L. REV., supra note 3, at 482.
32. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 139 (1981); Jones v. Brown, 516 P.2d 546, 548 (Okla. 1973).
33. Comment, 56 MARQ. L. Rav., supra note 3, at 89.
34. Oklahoma Journal PubI. Co. v. Coryell, 485 P.2d 1056, 1057-58 (Okla. 1971). See CLRK,
supra note 8, at ch. 5, § G.
35. 1975 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 105, § 161.
36. See Missouri-K.-T. R.R. v. Coryell, 483 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Okla. 1971) ("[Section] 139
is a general venue statute and has application only in those instances where a specific venue
statute is not applicable.").
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wherever they appear and any action brought under any such statute
may be maintained where brought. No court shall apply one venue
statute in preference to another whether considered general or special.""
Section 143 implies that when more than one venue provision applies,

venue is proper in more than one county, and the action may then
be brought in any of those counties. Section 139, consequently, is a
provision applicable to all individual resident defendants in transitory
actions." The language, "every other action," in section 139 should
be interpreted in light of the last sentence of that section39 to apply
to all actions except those within the local action rule of section 131.4°
If a plaintiff correctly brings suit in a county other than that of
the defendant's residence, a court's common law power under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens may be invoked upon defendant's
request to negate a plaintiff's original venue choice.," The addition
of Title 12, section 143, prohibiting a court from applying "one venue
statute in preference to another," does not abolish this doctrine.42 A
court, in considering the forum non conveniens question, therefore,
may balance the equities in determining whether the county of
defendant's residence or some other county is the best place for the
action to be litigated.
II.

The Local Action Rule

The basic rule in section 139 applies to transitory actions. Section
131 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes sets out a list of suits,
specifically excluded from section 139, which may properly be brought
only in the county where the subject of the action is situated. 3 It applies
37. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 143 (1981). See Harwood v. Woodson, 565 P.2d 1, 3 (Okla. 1977).
38. Section 139 should be construed as applying only to natural persons, and not to artificial
entities such as corporations. Section 139 provides that an action may be brought in the county
in which one of the defendants "resides." The word "resides" should limit § 139 to natural
persons because a corporation or business association may be situated in or do business in a
county, but it does not reside there as would a natural person. Fraser, Venue: Transfer or Dismissal
of Action Brought in a PrejudicialForum, 50 OKLA. B.A.J. 1958, 1960 (1979).
39. "Provided, however, this section [139] shall not in any way change or limit Section [1311.
." 12 OKLA. STAT. § 139 (1981). Section 131 is the local action rule.
40. See Fraser, supra note 27, at q-610. For a discussion of the local action rule, see infra
text accompanying notes 43-62.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 155-175.
42. Schwartz v. Diehl, 568 P.2d 280, 283 (Okla. 1977) (stating that the Oklahoma Court
of Appeals was incorrect when it ruled that § 143 overruled the doctrine of intrastate forum
non conveniens); Harwood v. Woodson, 565 P.2d 1, 3 (Okla. 1977) ("Section 143 does not
abolish or affect the application of forum non conveniens in this jurisdiction."). See Note, Venue:
The Import of New Section 143 of Title 12-The Specific No Longer Controls the General,
29 OKiA. L. REv. 774, 778-81 (1976).
43. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 131 (1981):
Actions for the following causes must be brought in the county in which the
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equally to Oklahoma residents and nonresidents.14 This restriction on

venue is called the local action rule. It is also a rule of subject matter
jurisdiction. 5
The first type of claim within the local action rule is one seeking
a determination of any estate or interest in real property or seeking

its recovery. 46 An "interest" in real property includes an accounting
action between joint adventurers over an oil and gas royalty, 47 as well
as an action to enforce a promise to apply unaccrued oil and gas lease

proceeds to payment on a note. 48 A railroad company instituting proceedings to condemn land must file in the county where the property
is located. 9

Second, the local action rule covers partition of real property.10
Third, suits involving the sale of real property under a mortgage,
lien, or other encumbrance are included."' "Real property" in this
section, however, has not been interpreted to incorporate lesser
"interests" of property such as leaseholds.1 2 The Oklahoma legislature
may have intended for suits analogous to those listed in section 131

to be subject to the local action rule. In regard to liens, for instance,
the legislature has so stated for actions to enforce liens on real
propert',5 3 and for suits concerning cemetery lot liens5 4 or deficiency

judgment liens held by the Commissioners of the Land Office. 5

subject of the action is situated, except as provided in the next section.
Ist, For the recovery of real property, or of any estate, or interest therein, or
the determination in any form of any such right or interest.
2nd, For the partition of real property.
3rd, For the sale of real property under a mortgage, lien, or other encumbrance
or charge.
4th, To quiet title, to establish a trust in, remove a cloud on, set aside a conveyance of, or to enforce or set aside an agreement to convey real property.
5th, For all damages to land, crops, or improvements thereon, action must be
brought in the county where the damage occurs.
44. Cf. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 503 (1981), which provides that when a cause of action concerning
an oil and gas leasehold is brought against a nonresident, venue is proper in the county in which
the oil and gas leasehold is located.
45. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Superior Court, 368 P.2d 475, 479, 484 (Okla. 1961). See
supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
46. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 131(1) (1981). See Welch v. Patrick, 133 Okla. 239, 240-41, 271 P.
660, 661-62 (1928).
47. Ross v. District Court, 199 Okla. 573, 188 P.2d 861, 862 (1948).
48. McCully v. McCully, 184 Okla. 264, 267, 86 P.2d 786, 789 (1939).
49. 66 OKLA. STAT. § 53 (1981).
50. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 131(2) (1981). See Anderson v. Anderson, 131 Okla. 95, 96-97, 267
P. 621, 622 (1928).
51. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 131(3) (1981). See Ames v. Milam, 53 Okla. 739, 744-45, 157 P. 941,
943 (1915).
52. Widick v. Phillips Pet. Co., 173 Okla. 325, 329, 49 P.2d 132, 137 (1935).
53. 42 OKLA. STAT. §§ 172, 177 (1981).

54. 11

OKLA. STAT.

55. 64

OKLA. STAT.

§ 26-111(B) (1981).
§ 82.1 (1981) provides: "The owner of any property which appears to
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The fourth category, found in section 131(4)," comprises quiet title
suits, 7 actions to remove a cloud on title, 8 suits to set aside a
conveyance of real property or an agreement to convey, and actions
to establish a trust in real property." Actions to enforce an agreement
to convey real property come within the local action rule in Oklahoma
only if damages are sought. In contrast, if specific performance of
a real estate contract is requested, the plaintiff has a choice of venue

in either the county where the land is located, or where the defendant
resides or may be summoned.60

Finally, the local action rule was amended in 195761 to include suits

62
for damage to land, crops, or real property improvements.

The rationale for the local action rule, a remnant of ancient English
venue practice, stems from the special position real property once
occupied in preindustrial society. This rationale retains some force today and suggests that a court in the county where land is located is
best able to deal with real property litigation. Land does not move

around. A local sheriff can attach and execute upon it. A local clerk
can make the necessary legal entries where land title is affected. Finally,
a local jury can view the land and may be better informed to justly
determine issues of valuation.63
A special problem arises when real property subject to the local action
rule is located in more than one county. Generally, if disputed land
consists of one tract, a plaintiff may sue in any county in which a
part of the property is located.6 ' If, however, the plaintiff sues to recover
possession of separate tracts of real property located in different
counties, the possession of such tracts must be recovered individually
in separate suits brought in the counties where such tracts are situated. 6
be subject to the lien of a deficiency judgment in favor of the Commissioners of the Land Office
may institute an action against the Commissioners of the Land Office in the county where the
land is situated .... "

56. 12
57.
58.
59.
60.
(1925).
61.

OKLA. STAT.

§ 131(4) (1981).

Franklin v. Margay Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519, 527, 153 P.2d 486, 497 (1944).
Brockman v. Roberts, 89 Okla. 59, 62, 213 P. 543, 545 (1923).
Morris v. Leverett, 434 P.2d 912, 919-20 (Okla. 1967).
12 OKA. STAT. § 132 (1981); Strain v. Statler, 112 Okla. 233, 233-35, 240 P. 614, 614-15
1957 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 78.

62. 12

OKLA. STAT.

§ 131(5) (1981).

63. Stevens, supra note 3, at 310.
64. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 132 (1981) provides in part: "If real property, the subject of an action,
be an entire tract, and situated in two or more counties, or if it consists of separate tracts,
situated in two or more counties, the action may be brought in any county in which any tract,
or part thereof, is situated ....
" See also McNee v. Hart, 117 Okla. 220, 221, 246 P. 373,
374 (1926) (dictum).
65. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 132 (1981) further provides:
[If] it be an action to recover possession [of real property], and if the property
be an entire tract situated in two or more counties, an action to recover possession

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss3/5
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III.

ParticularTransitory Actions

Outside of the local action rule, which covers most claims pertaining

to real property in Oklahoma,66 the basic rule for transitory actions
is that the defendant should be sued in the county of his residence

or where he is served process. 7 In regard to particulartransitory actions,
however, a plaintiff is frequently authorized by statute to select another

county for filing a suit in addition to those authorized by the basic
rule. The supplemental nature of these special provisions is supported
by section 143 of Title 12, enacted in 1975, which provides that all

venue statutes are cumulative no matter where they appear. Furthermore,
no court should prefer one venue statute over another, regardless of
68
whether it is considered general or special.

The legislative options for broadening a plaintiff's venue selection

for certain transitory actions against resident Oklahoma defendants
generally include either (1) the county where the cause of action (or
a part thereof) arose, or (2) the county of another significant person's
residence.
The Oklahoma statutes allow several types of suits to be brought

in the county where the cause of action, or some part thereof, arose.
Convenience of witnesses is the most likely reason for allowing actions
to be brought where the cause of action arose. To qualify as a part

of the cause of action, an act relied upon to establish venue must be
one of the facts which, as a matter of substantive law, constitutes the
cause of action. 9
Section 133 of Title 12, to illustrate, provides that venue is proper

in the county or counties where the cause of action or some part arose
in two kinds of claims. 70 First, section 133(1) includes suits to recover

a fine, forfeiture, or penalty imposed by statute.7 ' Second, section 133(3)
thereof may be brought in either of such counties; but if it consists of separate
tracts, in different counties, the possession of such tracts must be recovered by
separate actions brought in the counties where such tracts are situated.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 43-65.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
68. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 143 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
69. Doughty v. Martin, 509 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Okla. 1973) (where the alleged negligence of
Public Service Company occurred in Custer County, the court rejected respondent's argument
that venue was proper in Canadian County pursuant to § 134 of Title 12 on the ground that
part of the cause of action arose in Canadian County); American Body & Trailer Co. v. Higgins,
195 Okla. 349, 351-54, 156 P.2d 1005, 1007-10 (1944) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that part
of the cause of action arose in Pittsburg County, and that venue was therefore proper there,
when defendant's salesman orally negotiated with plaintiff at plaintiffs office in Pittsburg County).
70. A third category, claims against a particularparty defendant (such as a public officer),
is covered in 12 OKLA. STAT. § 133(2) (1981), and will be discussed fully infra in the text
accompanying notes 106-112.
71. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 133(1) (1981). See Carnation Co. v. Superior Court, 392 P.2d 490,
491 (Okla. 1964).
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includes actions on an official bond for a public officer." These suits
are usually against an insurance company which acts as the surety.7 3
An analogous provision permits a plaintiff to sue for damages arising
from the use of a motor vehicle or boat in a county where "the damages
' Finally,
or a part thereof were sustained." 74
another statute allows one
to sue to collect on a debt, an open account, or on a contract for
goods and services in the county where the debt was contracted or
7
an instrument of indebtedness was given. "
The other venue option allowed by the Oklahoma legislature is the
county of residence of a person significant to the lawsuit, other than
the defendant. For instance, in divorce, annulment, or separate
maintenance actions, the plaintiff's residence (for at least 30 days in
divorce and annulment suits) is an alternative venue to that of the basic
rule. 76 Similarly, the plaintiffs county of residence is proper in child
support or alimony cases." Other examples of the use of residence
include: the minor's residence in a guardianship case; 8 the decedent's
residence at the time of death when a will is probated or letters
testamentary or letters of administration are granted;7 9 the residence
of a deceased life or joint tenant when a petition is filed to terminate
a tenancy in real property;8" and a trustee's residence in a suit to interpret trust provisions."'
72. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 133(3) (1981).
73. See, e.g., Stains v. District Court, 376 P.2d 592, 594 (Okla. 1962).
74. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 141 (1981); Adams v. Stapp, 297 P.2d 389, 392 (Okla. 1956).
75. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 142 (1981); Price v. Mize, 628 P.2d 705, 706 (Okla. 1981).
76. An action for divorce or annulment may be brought in the county in which the plaintiff
has resided for at least 30 days prior to the filing of the petition. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1272.1(a)
(1981). See Park v. Park, 610 P.2d 826, 827 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980). An action for separate
maintenance may be brought in the county where the plaintiff resides when the petition is filed.

12

OKLA. STAT.

§ 1272.1(b) (1981).

77. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1600.10 (1981) provides that all duties of support are enforceable via
proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. See id. § 1600.1. Section 1600.1(b) of Title 12 also provides that a petition in a proceeding to enforce a support
duty "may be filed in the appropriate court of any state in which the obligee resides." (Emphasis
added.)
78. The court of each county may appoint a guardian for minors who are residents of that
county. 58 OKaA. STAT. § 761 (1981). When the domicile of the minor is changed from the
county where guardianship is pending to another county in the state, the guardianship "may
be removed to such other county, which would be the proper venue." Id. § 10. See Micco v.
Huser, 185 Okla. 394, 396-97, 91 P.2d 1069, 1072-73 (1939).
79. "Wills must be proved, and letters testamentary or of administration granted . . .[i]n
the county of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death, in whatever place
he may have died." 58 OKLA. STAT. § 5(1) (1981); In re Estate of Brown, 600 P.2d 857, 860
(Okla. 1979).
80. 58 OKLA. STAT. § 911 (1981).
81. "The venue of such actions [construing trust provisions] shall be in the county where
the trustees or any cotrustee resides." 60 OKRA. STAT. § 175.23(B) (1981). See State ex rel. Wick
v. Carroll, 408 P.2d 550, 551-52 (Okla. 1965).
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Appendix 1 lists other statutes allowing venue in transitory actions
in a county other than where the defendant resides or can be served.
IV.

Particular Defendants in Transitory Actions: Nonresidents,
Corporations, Governmental Entities and Others

The basic venue rule for transitory actions (the county of defendant's
residence or where he is served process)" may be inapplicable to certain
types of defendants. A nonresident, for example, has no residence in
Oklahoma. Corporations, business associations, trusts, and governmental entities are all fictional creations that do not "reside" as do human
beings. Therefore, special rules are required to allow plaintiffs to sue
nonresidents (who cannot be served process within Oklahoma) and legal
entities other than natural persons.83
Consider the situation of a nonresident defendant. The general rule
is that a plaintiff may sue a nonresident defendant in any Oklahoma
county where: (1) the cause of action arose; (2) the plaintiff resides;
(3) the defendant may be served process; or (4) the defendant owns
property or is owed debts.8" The Oklahoma Supreme Court has found,
under section 137, that the presence of property alone is sufficient for
venue. 85 The same is true for the situs of a debt. The location of a
debtor's legal obligation to pay for goods, to illustrate, is either where
the agreement was made, the place of payment, or the place of delivery.
It is not the residence of the debtor, as if he carried the debt on his
person.8 6 Although the presence of property or a debt satisfies the venue
requirement (as does the county where a defendant may be summoned),
lack of convenience to the defendant may require a judge to transfer
87
a case intrastate if requested under the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Special provisions dealing with nonresident defendant venue are set
forth in Appendix 2. These cumulative specific provisions should be
82. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
83. See Stevens, supra note 3, at 334. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1976).
84. 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 137, 187(c) (1981).
85. Gulf Oil Co. v. Woodson, 505 P.2d 484, 487 (Okla. 1972).
86. Riffe Pet. Co. v. McMichael Asphalt Sales Co., 585 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Okla. 1978). See
also Annual Survey of Oklahoma Law, 5 OKLA. Crny U.L. REv. 37, 76-77 (1980) (discussing Riffe).
87. See Simpson v. Woodson, 508 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Okla. 1973) (Plaintiff was a resident
of Noble County; defendant and his personal representatives were residents of Kay County; and
the cause of action arose in Noble County. The parties, all but one of the lay witnesses, and
the principal medical witnesses resided in the three contiguous counties of Kay, Noble, and Garfield.
In addition, the majority of the medical witnesses were amenable to process in Kay or Noble
County. Alternatively, none of the witnesses resided in Creek County, and the action was of
no legal importance to the residents of Creek County. The supreme court, consequently, ordered
the case transferred from Creek to either Kay or Noble County under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens); Fraser, supra note 27, at q-609-10. See infra text accompanying notes 155-175.
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read in conjunction with the basic nonresident venue rules in sections
137 and 187(c)."8 Thus, a plaintiff suing a nonresident covered by a
specific section could rely either upon that section or upon the general

provisions in sections 137 and 187(c). Appendix 2 also includes venue
provisions for domestic corporations, business associations and trusts,
foreign corporations, government entities, insurance and surety
companies, and transportation and turnpike companies.
The general venue provision for domestic corporations is provided

in section 134 of Title 12. An Oklahoma corporation may properly
be sued in a county: (1) where it is situated (including the location
of its principal office or place of business); (2) where any of its principal officers reside or may be summoned; or (3) where the cause of
action or some part thereof arose. 89 Municipal corporations (such as
cities) are covered by this section," and the language "situated," in
the context of a municipal corporation, refers to the county where the

corporation has its seat of government. 9 To be situated in a county,
a corporation must have more than the temporary presence of its

employees or agents in that county.9 2 In addition, the residence of a
nonmanagerial employee does not qualify as a "principal officer's"
residence. 93 Finally, to be part of a cause of action, the act relied upon
for venue must constitute94one of the facts that substantive law requires
for the cause of action.
Venue for unincorporated business associations (sued under their
88. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 143 (1981) (all venue statutes, wherever located, are cumulative).
89. Id. § 134.
90. City of Cushing v. Coryell, 400 P.2d 174, 175 (Okla. 1965).
91. Oklahoma City v. District Court, 429 P.2d 791, 793 (Okla. 1967).
92. Doughty v. Martin, 509 P.2d 122, 125 (Okla. 1973) (where Public Service Company had
no office and no employees or agents employed in Canadian County, the fact that its employees
entered Canadian County to construct a transmission line and at times entered to service the
line would not support the respondent's contention that Public Service Company was situated
in Canadian County to make venue proper there pursuant to § 134). Cf. Public Serv. Co. v.
Hawkins, 194 Okla. 272, 273-78, 149 P.2d 783, 785-89 (1944) ("situated in" is not synonymous
with "principal office or place of business," and venue is proper in any county where the corporation regularly maintains an office or place of business with employees or agents carrying
on its business, even though the principal office or place of business is in another county).
93. SeeCity of Cushing v. Coryell, 400 P.2d 174 (Okla. 1965). In Cushing the plaintiff brought
suit in Creek County against the city of Cushing, a municipal corporation situated in Payne
County, and an individual employed by the city of Cushing, who resided in Creek County. The
city filed an action seeking a writ of prohibition, contending venue was proper in Payne County
rather than Creek County. The plaintiff contended that venue was proper in Creek County,
since the individual was an employee of the city. The court found that the only proper venue
for an action against the city was Payne County; the mere fact an individual was an employee
of the city had no legal significance. 400 P.2d at 175-76.
94. American-First Title & Trust Co. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 415 P.2d 930, 935
(Okla. 1966). See supra text accompanying notes 69-75.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss3/5

1983]

COMMENTAR Y

business name), as well as for trusts, is identical to venue for domestic
96
corporations.9 5 Trade unions are also included in this category.

The general venue provisions for foreign corporations track the rules
for nonresident defendants, but are even more liberal from the plaintiffs

perspective. A suit may be properly brought where: (1) the cause of
action arose; (2) the plaintiff resides; (3) the corporation may be

"found" and served process, 97 including service on the service agent;
(4) the corporation owns property or is owed debts; or (5) the cor-

poration maintains its principal place of business. 98 The Oklahoma con-

stitution provides that actions against a foreign corporation can be
brought in the county where the cause of action arose, plaintiff resides,

or the corporation's service agent is found.99 The legislature has allowed
no additional venue options in actions against foreign insurance
corporations.'10 However, the legislature is not limited to the provisions of the Oklahoma constitution; it has provided additional counties in which a foreign corporation may be sued."'
Section 471 of Title 18 requires that a foreign corporate defendant
"do business" in Oklahoma before it can be subject to venue under
this section. 0 2 This affects the use of venue categories two through
five, set out above, when the plaintiff relies upon a long-arm statute

that demands fewer contacts than the common law "doing business"
for personal jurisdiction.0 3 However, because the Oklahoma constitution is more liberal for categories two and three, by omitting the "doing business" requirement,' 0 4 the constitution should prevail and permit
95. "Venue in such cases [suits against unincorporated associations and trusts], in addition
to that now provided, shall be the same as that provided for actions involving domestic corporations." 12 OKLA. STAT. § 182 (1981).
96 See Torbett v. International Typographical Union, 536 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Okla. App. 1975).
97. Cf. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 163 (1981) (service of summons).
98. OKLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 43; 12 OKLA. STAT. § 137 (1981); 18 OKLA. STAT. § 471 (1981).
See Fraser, supra note 38, at 1960.
99. OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 43.
100. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 137 (1981).
101. Marathon Metallic Bldg. Co. v. District Court, 515 P.2d 230, 232 (Okla. 1973).
102. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 471 (1981) provides:
Any foreign corporation, doing business in the State of Oklahoma, and any person now or hereafter having any cause of action against such corporation, arising
on contract, tort, or otherwise, may file suit in any county in the State of Oklahoma
where the plaintiff resides or where said corporation has its principal place of
business, or has property, or in any county where said corporation has an agent
appointed upon whom service of summons or other process may be had.
(Emphasis added.) See Braniff v. Coffield, 199 Okla. 604, 605-06, 608, 190 P.2d 815, 818, 820
(1947).
103. See 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 187(a)(2)-(3), 1701.03(a)(3)-(5) (1981); CLARK, supra note 8, at
ch. 5, § E.
104. OKLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 43.
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a plaintiffs use of the second and third categories without regard to

the "doing business" requirement.'
In suing a governmental entity through its public officers or
administrative agencies for their official acts, special venue rules are
applicable. First, a suit against a public official, 0 6 for an act or omission
while performing his official duties, must be brought in the county
where the cause of action or some part thereof arose. 0 7 In suing a
local official such as a sheriff, venue will be proper in the county where
the sheriff works because his authority does not extend beyond the
county borders.'

In dealing with a state official, on the other hand,

the Oklahoma Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted section 133(2)
of Title 12 to mean that a cause of action arose where the decisional

act of the public officer (normally the director of a state agency,
department, or board) occurred. This decisional act is presumed to
occur at the official residence of the state agency, usually in Oklahoma
County.' 9 For instance, in an action to enjoin a state board from enforcing an unconstitutional statute, the cause of action arises in the
county of the board's official residence-Oklahoma County. That agents
of the board may proceed in other counties in administering the statute
is immaterial for venue determination." 0 To resolve the problem of
finding a proper court for multiple defendant suits, when one of the
defendants is a high-ranking state official, the mention of part of a
cause of action in section 133"' should probably be interpreted to per-

mit venue in a county where a state board's agents carry out acts that
harm the plaintiff." 2
105. But see Fraser, supra note 38, at 1960 ("If, however, a corporation is not doing business
and does not have an agent who can be served in a county where it owns property, compelling
the corporation to defend an action in that county would impose an unfair burden on the
corporation.").
106. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has included a state agency within the meaning of the
term "public officer" found in § 133 of Title 12 when an action is brought against the agency.
See, e.g., Oklahoma Ordinance Works Auth. v. District Court, 613 P.2d 746, 749 (Okla. 1980)
("OOWA is a 'public officer' within the contemplation of § 133."); State ex rel. State Bd. of
Educ., 290 P.2d 413, 416 (Okla. 1955) (State Board of Education was a "public officer" within
the comprehensive meaning of the term as used in § 133).
107. 12 OaA. STAT. § 133 (1981).
108. Schwartz v. Diehl, 568 P.2d 280, 283 (Okla. 1977).
109. Grand River Dam Auth. v. State, 645 P.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Okla. 1982); Department of
Indus. Dev. v. Dalton, 560 P.2d 971, 973 (Okla. 1977); State ex rel.State Bd. of Educ. v. District
Court, 290 P.2d 413, 418 (Okla. 1955).
110. State ex rel. Director of Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Smith, 519 P.2d 477,
478-79 (Okla. 1974); State ex rel State Dry Cleaners' Bd. v. District Court, 340 P.2d 939, 942
(Okla. 1959).
111. "Actions... must be brought in the county... where the cause, or some part thereof
" 12 OKLA. STAT. § 133 (1981) (emphasis added).
arose ...
112. State ex reL. Director of Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Smith, 519 P.2d 477,
479-82 (Okla. 1974) (Doolin, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Justice Doolin pointed out that in the cases upon which the majority relied,
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Second, proper venue for an action against an administrative agency

governed by the Administrative Procedures Act" 3 is either in the county
of plaintiff's residence or where plaintiff's rights (including property

interests) are affected."I Actions against administrative agencies include
declaratory judgment actions to determine the validity or applicability

of rules adopted by a state agency,"
individual agency proceedings.'

16

5

as well as judicial review of

The Administrative Procedures Act

does not, however, control the issuance of an Attorney General's formal
written opinion."II The venue provisions for suits against other governmental entities are listed in Appendix 2. Notice, in addition, that
municipal corporations are treated under the venue rules for domestic
corporations. " II

Finally, Appendix 2 also lists special venue provisions for suits against
three other types of defendants: insurance and surety companies,

transportation companies, and turnpike companies.
V.

Multiple Claims and Defendants

When a plaintiff joins more than one claim or asks for multiple
remedies in his petition, sues more than one defendant, or when two
or more plaintiffs bring suit, the venue issue may become much more
difficult to resolve. In certain cases, venue as a restrictive device may
force the plaintiff to drop one or more parties from the lawsuit.

The general rule in Oklahoma, when a plaintiff joins multiple claims
Oklahoma County was the proper venue for actions against the ABC Board because no overt
acts of the regulatory agents had been committed in the county where venue was sought. Id.
at 479. In ABC v. Smith, however, the ABC agents actually acted in Ottawa County. The primary
thrust of the suit was not against the Board, but rather against the acts of the multiple defendants, including the ABC agents, who acted in Ottawa County. Id. at 479-80. Justice Doolin
looked to Kansas law and found that when the Kansas Supreme Court interpreted a statute similar
to 12 OKLA. STAT. § 133 (1981), it construed it in conjunction with a provision similar to
Oklahoma's § 139. The Kansas court decided that where local residents were joined as defendants along with a state school superintendent, the state superintendent could be sued in any
county in which the local citizens resided. Id. at 481. See generally infra text accompanying
notes 119-135.
113. 75 OKLA. STAT. §§ 301-326 (1981 & Supp. 1982). See CLARK, supra note 8, at ch. 4, § E.
114. 75 OKLA. STAT. §§ 306, 318.2 (1981).
115. The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action for declaratory
judgment in the district court of the county of the residence of the person seeking
relief or . . . in the county wherein the rule sought to be applied . . . threatens
. . . the legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff ....
Id. § 306. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Labor,
628 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Okla. 1981).
116. "In all other instances [those not reviewable directly by the supreme court], proceedings
for review shall be instituted by filing a petition in the district court of the county in which
the party seeking review resides or .. . where the property interest affected is situated . .. .

75

OKLA. STAT.

§ 318(2) (1981).

117. Grand River Dam Auth. v. State, 645 P.2d 1011, 1012-13, 1017-18 (Okla. 1982).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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or requests more than one form of relief, is that venue (when more
than one venue provision is implicated) is determined by the principal
object of the litigation. For instance, if the principal action is local
in nature, joining an ancillary transitory action will not transform the
suit into a transitory one." 9 When title to land will be directly affected
by a court's judgment, an action is local; venue is proper in the county
where the land lies. Alternatively, if title is only incidentally affected
(and a cause of action otherwise falls outside section 131 of Title 12),
the action is transitory.' 21 If a plaintiff primarily sues for specific
performance of a contract to convey title to real property, and in the
alternative requests damages for breach of contract, venue is proper
in the county where the land is situated.' 2' The court in that county,
moreover, may award either remedy.' 22 The same "principal object
of the litigation" analysis is required when a plaintiff joins two transitory
causes of action.
A plaintiff who sues multiple defendants must bring his transitory
action in a county that meets the venue requirements applicable to all
defendants.' 23 This rule is not as strict as it might at first appear because
several Oklahoma statutes provide for venue in multiple defendant
situations.
First, the general rule when at least one of the defendants is a natural
person is that a plaintiff may sue in a county where "one of the
defendants resides or may be summoned."' 24 This rule favors the
convenience of individual Oklahoma resident defendants over that of
corporations and other artificial legal entities. t2 Once an action has
been correctly brought in a county under section 139 of Title 12, because
one of the defendants resides or may be summoned there, the remaining
119. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Superior Court, 368 P.2d 475, 482-84 (Okla. 1962); Fox v.
Superior Court, 368 P.2d 484, 485 (Okla. 1961).
120. Mills v. District Court, 187 Okla. 247, 249-50, 102 P.2d 589, 591-92 (1940). See Morris
v. Leverett, 434 P.2d 912, 918-19 (Okla. 1967); Ruggles v. First Nat'l Bank, 558 P.2d 419, 421-22
(Okla. App. 1976); Annual Survey of Oklahoma Law, 2 OiaA. Civ U.L. REv. 51, 372-74 (1977).
See generally supra text accompanying notes 43-62 (discussing local action rule).
121. Pasley v. DeWeese, 183 Okla. 424, 426, 82 P.2d 1066, 1067 (1938). See 12 OKLA. STAT.

§ 132 (1981).
122. Pasley v. DeWeese, 183 Okla. 424, 426, 82 P.2d 1066, 1067 (1938).
123. Schwartz v. Diehl, 568 P.2d 280, 283 (Okla. 1977); City of McAlester v. Fogg, 312 P.2d
867, 871 (Okla. 1956) ("[W]e conclude that venue of actions against multiple joint defendants,
lies only in the county or counties meeting the requirements of all applicable venue statutes ....
See Annual Survey of Oklahoma Law, 3 OK.a. Crny U.L. REv. 53, 324-25 (1978).
124. 12 OraA. STAT. § 139 (1981) (emphasis added). See also Id. § 1653 (declaratory judgment
actions); Frazer, supra note 27, at q-610-11.
125. See Thornton v. Woodson, 570 P.2d 340, 342 (Okla. 1977); Recent Development, 32
OKLA. L. Rav. 729-30 (1979). See generally Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Martin, 530 P.2d 131, 133
(Okla. 1974); Jones v. Brown, 516 P.2d 546, 548 (Okla. 1973) (defendant's residence is the preferred
venue); supra at text accompanying notes 28-30.
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defendants may be127served process either elsewhere in Oklahoma,26 or
outside the state.

A second general rule provides for venue over a domestic corporation
in a multiple defendant suit. In addition to the counties for proper

venue listed in section 134 of Title 12,128 a plaintiff may also sue a
domestic corporation "in any county where a codefendant . . . may
properly be sued.' '" 29 This rule also applies to business associations,
trusts, and municipal corporations. 3
Third, a general rule also provides for venue over a nonresident or

a foreign corporation in the multiple defendant context. In addition
to the counties for proper venue listed in Appendix 2-primarily allowed
in sections 137 and 187(c) of Title 12' 1-a plaintiff may also sue a
nonresident or foreign corporation (except for foreign insurance
companies) "in any county where a codefendant may properly be
sued."'13 2 Section 137, however, must be read in conjunction with section
187(c). 1 If one or more of the codefendants is an Oklahoma resident,
the action should be brought in a county where venue would be proper
for at least one of the Oklahoma codefendants. 3 4 Alternatively, if all
the defendants are nonresidents or foreign corporations, suit may be
filed in the county where the cause of action arose or where the plain-

tiff (or one of the plaintiffs) resides.'
The three general rules providing for venue in multiple defendant
suits have certain requirements to guarantee that a plaintiff does not

add an extra defendant to manipulate the choice of venue. 16 First,
the plaintiff must state a substantial cause of action against the
126. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 154 (1981) provides: "Where the action is rightly brought in any county,
a summons shall be issued to any other county against one or more of the defendants, at the
plaintiff's request." See Schwartz v. Diehl, 568 P.2d 280, 283 (Okla. 1977) (only when all applicable
venue statutory requirements are met is the action "rightly brought" as authorized by § 154).

127. 12

OKLA. STAT.

§ 170.1 (1981).

128. Discussed supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
129. 12 OKIA. STAT. § 134 (1981). This additional venue location was added to § 134 by a
1970 amendment. 1970 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 190, § 2.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96; Appendix 2.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88, 97-105.
132. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 137 (1981). This additional venue location was added to § 137 by a
1975 amendment. 1975 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 125, § I.
133. See Thornton v. Woodson, 570 P.2d 340, 341-42 (Okla. 1977). See also Recent Development, supra note 125, at 729-31 (discussing Thornton).
134. "If one or more of the defendants is a resident of this state, the action shall be brought
in any county where venue would be proper as to the resident defendant or one of the resident
defendants if there are several." 12 OKLA. STAT. § 187(c) (1981). SeeFraser, supra note 38, at 1960.
135. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 187(c) (1981) provides: "[A]n action which is brought under [§ 187(a)]
where all defendants are nonresidents of this state may be brought in the county where the cause
of action arose or in the county where the plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs resides."
136. See Fraser, supra note 20, at 187-93.
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defendant who implicates the multiple defendant provision relied upon.
This, for instance, would be the "codefendant" properly sued in Title
12, sections 134 and 137, or the "defendant" in section 139 sued where
he resides or may be summoned.'1 7 Second, the implicating defendant
must be properly joined as a party.' 38 Some cases mention in dicta
that this defendant must be a necessary party,' 39 but several liability
should be sufficient because the 1959 amendment to section 265 of
Title 12 allows a plaintiff to unite causes of action arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence without each cause affecting all
defendants. 140
Finally, new parties may be added to an existing lawsuit by a plaintiff
through an amended petition only where all the relevant venue provisions
are followed.'," A defendant, alternatively, may add a new party when
the joinder statutes permit if venue is correctly laid as to an original
defendant. Process can be served on the new party outside the county
where the action is brought.'
VI.

Change of Venue

A plaintiff who has a choice of proper counties in which to sue in
Oklahoma will normally try to select the forum most favorable to
himself. In so doing he may choose a venue where the defendant cannot
obtain a fair trial or where the defendant would be greatly
inconvenienced. The plaintiff's strategy, in fact, may be to intentionally
harass the defendant and convince him to settle the lawsuit.
Section 140 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes authorizes either
party to apply for a change of venue when it appears that a fair and
impartial trial is impossible in the forum originally selected.'4" Transfer
may be made within Oklahoma to some other county where a fair trial

137. See Eberle v. Dyer Constr. Co., 598 P.2d 1189, 1191-93 (Okla. 1979); Bill Hodges Truck
Co. v. Williams, 470 P.2d 310, 314-15, 317 (Okla. 1970); Powers v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
392 P.2d 744, 746 (Okla. 1964).
138. Lane v. Cook, 602 P.2d 651, 654 (Okla. 1979); Dunbar v. Tulsa Metro. Water Auth.,
363 P.2d 145, 148 (Okla. 1961).
139. E.g., Lane v. Cook, 602 P.2d 651, 654 (Okla. 1979).

140. See, e.g., Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Okla. 1978); Fraser, Service on
NonresidentDefendants Outside County Where Action Is Brought, 51 OKLA. B.A.J. 1035 (1980).
141. Marsh v. District Court, 579 P.2d 832, 835 (Okla. 1978).
142. Haynes v. City Nat'l Bank, 30 Okla. 614, 619-20, 121 P. 182, 185 (1912); Frazer, supra

note 20, at 193.
143. 12

OKLA. STAT.

§ 140 (1981) provides: "In all cases in which it is made to appear to

the court that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the suit is pending,
the court may, on the application of either party, change the place of trial to some county where

such objections do not exist."
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would be possible.'" Proper grounds for transfer exist where a party

can show that the judge is biased'" 5 or that local prejudice would

preclude the selection of a fair jury.'1 6 This section may also authorize
a court to transfer a suit where a party cannot obtain a fair trial because

47
crucial witnesses reside in another county and cannot be subpoenaed.'

A motion is appropriate for venue change before the date fixed for

the filing of an answer.'4 8 Furthermore, it should also be proper to
49
combine a motion for change of venue with the defendant's answer.'

The motion for a change of venue must state the facts on which it
is based, rather than mere conclusions.' 50 The motion should also be
supported by affidavits.''
When a fair trial cannot be obtained in Oklahoma, or when a court
finds that in the "interest of substantial justice" the action should be
heard in another forum, the Uniform Interstate and International
53
Procedure Act' 2 permits a judge to stay or dismiss the suit.' In
exercising his discretion, a judge should consider the relative inconven-

144. Id. The granting of a change of venue is, however, within the discretion of the trial
court. Arkansas-La. Gas Co. v. Ackley, 410 P.2d 35, 36 (Okla. 1965); Arkansas-La. Gas Co.
v. Maggi, 409 P.2d 369, 371 (Okla. 1965). A trial court's ruling will not be reversed unless there
is abuse of this discretion.
145. Maharry v. Maharry, 5 Okla. 371, 372-73, 47 P. 1051 (1897). See Gee v. Security Bank
& Trust Co., 186 Okla. 477, 479, 98 P.2d 922, 924 (1939); Fraser, supra note 20, at 186.
146. See Dean v. Stone, 2 Okla. 13, 16-17, 35 P. 578, 579-80 (1894).
147. Fraser, supra note 20, at 186. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 390 (1981) (witnesses may only be
summoned from the county of their residence, an adjoining county, or where they may be found);
Harwood v. Woodson, 565 P.2d 1, 3 (Okla. 1977) (compulsory process as to medical witnesses
who resided in Oklahoma County is denied under § 390, with venue in Creek County, a nonadjoining county).
148. Halliburton Co. v. District Court, 525 P.2d 628, 630 (Okla. 1974).
149. Ada-Konawa Bridge Co. v. Cargo, 163 Okla. 122, 125, 21 P.2d 1, 5 (1932) (A venue
question "could have been properly presented at any time prior to the time of filing the answer,
or ... at the time the answer was filed."); OKU.A. DIST. CT. R. 3, 12 OKLA. STAT. ch. 2 app.
(Supp. 1983) ("Objections to . . . the venue of an action . . . may be filed before the filing
of any other motion or any pleading or they may be filed with the first instruments filed by
the defendant, whether it be a motion, a demurrer, an answer, or a combination of such instruments .... "). See Halliburton Co. v. District Court, 525 P.2d 628, 629 (Okla. 1974) (citing
Ada-Konawa). See also Jones v. Balsley, 27 Okla. 220, 224, 111 P. 942, 944 (1910) (venue may
be raised once the issues are joined).
150. Gulf Oil Co. v. Woodson, 505 P.2d 484, 490 (Okla. 1972). See OKLA. DIsr. CT. R. 3(c)(1),
12 OKLA. STAT. ch 2 app. (Supp. 1983) (motion challenging venue must specifically state legal
and factual deficiencies relied upon); TULSA COUNTY DisT. CT. R. 10 (1981) (motion must contain specific legal and factual defects relied on).
151. Gulf Oil Co. v. Woodson, 505 P.2d 484, 490 (Okla. 1972). See OaA. Disr. CT. R. 3(c)(2),
12 OKLA. STAT. ch. 2 app. (Supp. 1983) ("Motions raising fact issues shall be verified by a
").
person having knowledge of the facts . .
152. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1706.04 (1981).
153. Id. § 1701.05. See Unif. Interstate and Int'l Procedure Act § 1.05, 13 U.L.A. 476-78 (1980).
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ience to both parties and witnesses in the original forum and in a proper
alternative forum (i.e., a court with both jurisdiction and venue). A
court should not dismiss an action unless the plaintiff has another forum
open to him. The defendant's cooperation may be obtained by conditioning dismissal upon a defendant's stipulation to submit to the jurisdiction of the forum he claims to be convenient and to waive reliance
upon applicable statutes of limitation, or by staying the proceedings
in the original forum and postponing dismissal until those conditions
have been satisfied.'5" The plaintiff's cooperation may be obtained by
granting a dismissal unless the plaintiff consents to suit in the alternative
forum.
In addition to this statutory authority, Oklahoma courts have the
power to dismiss a case under the common law doctrine of interstate
forum non conveniens.'"5 The doctrine of forum non conveniens asserts

the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction
and venue whenever it appears that a plaintiff's action may be more
appropriately tried in another place.5 6 The doctrine is discretionary
in the sense that the defendant has no right to shift litigation to another
forum; the plaintiffs original choice is normally given substantial weight.
There are three requirements to forum non conveniens: (1) jurisdiction,
both subject matter and personal, and venue must be proper in the
original forum; 57 (2) this forum must be seriously inconvenient; 5 8 and
(3) an alternative, more convenient forum exists that also has proper
jurisdiction and venue.159

60
The United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert
described the factors a judge should consider in deciding whether to
dismiss a suit under the forum non conveniens doctrine. In short, a
judge should balance (1) the private interests of the defendant in an
alternative forum, and the public interests of that alternative forum,
against (2) the plaintiff's choice of the original forum (giving it
substantial weight), and the public interests of that original forum.
As the Court explained these factors:

An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed,
154. Unif. Interstate and Int'l Procedure Act § 1.05 comment, 13 U.L.A. 476-77 (1980); F.
JAMEs & 0. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 660 (2d ed. 1977).
155. Pruit Tool & Supply Co. v. Windham, 379 P.2d 849, 850 (Okla. 1963); St. Louis-S.F.
Ry. v. Superior Court, 276 P.2d 773, 777-78 (Okla. 1954); Note, Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction:
Forum Non Conveniens, 8 OKLA. L. REv. 220-23 (1955).
156. JAm s & HAZARD, supra note 154, at 657-60.
157. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
158. Id. at 506-07.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; [as well as the] possibility
of view of premises . . . There may also be questions as to the
enforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh
relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial .... But unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice
of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have [a] place in applying the
doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation
is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin.
Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people
of a community which has no relation to the litigation .... There
is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.
There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial... in a forum
that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather
than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in
conflict of laws . ..

.16

An Oklahoma court may not transfer a suit to another state's courts
even if it finds that a plaintiff's choice of forum should be vetoed.
Dismissal is the appropriate action for implementing forum non
conveniens on an interstate basis. As a court of equity, however, the
Oklahoma tribunal may condition its dismissal on the agreement of
the defendant to submit to personal jurisdiction in the more convenient
forum and to waive the statute of limitations defense. 6 '
Oklahoma courts, in implementing intrastate forum non conveniens,
do have the power to transfersuits to a court in the more convenient
Oklahoma county where venue is proper. 63 Section 95.4 of Title 20
permits an action to be transferred from one city to another within
the same county.' 6 Oklahoma courts consider the same factors mentioned in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,6 5 such as the distance witnesses
must travel and the burden of jury duty on a community. 6 Forum
non conveniens is a common law doctrine, moreover, and is unaffected

161. Id.
162. See supra text accompanying note 154.
163. Simpson v. Woodson, 508 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Okla. 1973); Gulf Oil Co. v. Woodson,
505 P.2d 484, 489-90 (Okla. 1972).
164. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 95.4 (1981). 20 OKLA. STAT. § 95.6 (1981) allows a district court to
adopt procedures for the transfer of cases within that district as long as the practices do not

conflict with any rules of the supreme court.
165. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
166. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Martin, 530 P.2d 131, 133-34 (Okla. 1974); Simpson v. Woodson, 508 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Okla. 1973).
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by section 143 of Title 12 which applies only to venue statutes.'17
The use of intrastate forum non conveniens is particularly appropriate
in Oklahoma because so many statutes provide that venue is properly
located in a county that has no real connection with either the parties
or the cause of action.'16 Examples include the county where a defendant
is summoned,' 69 where a principal officer of a corporation is served,'7
or where a nonresident or foreign corporation may have debts owing.'
Forum non conveniens is a defendant's remedy to protect himself
and the court against plaintiff's harassment in selecting an inconvenient forum. A motion for change of venue (intrastate transfer) or
dismissal (interstate refiling), to avoid waiver, should be filed before
the date fixed for the filing of an answer.'" It is arguable that a
defendant should also be allowed to combine this motion with his
answer.' 73 Of course, if venue is improper, the action will be dismissed
upon a defendant's timely objection.' 74 A plaintiff then has one year
from dismissal to commence another suit where venue is proper if the
original statute of limitation has expired by the time a new action is
filed.' 715

167. Schwartz v. Diehli, 568 P.2d 280, 283 (Okla. 1977); Harwood v. Woodson, 565 P.2d
1, 3 (Okla. 1977) ("Section 143 does not abolish or affect the application of forum non conveniens in this jurisdiction. That doctrine is born in common law."). See Annual Survey of Oklahoma
Law: Pleadings and Procedure, 30oKLA. CIT U.L. REV. 53, 326-27 (1978); Recent Development, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 992-93 (1977).
168. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Cook, 594 P.2d 369, 374 (Okla. 1979); Fraser, Venue:
Forum Non Conveniens and the FairAdministration of Justice, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 766 (1978).
169. 12 OKiLA. STAT. §§ 137, 139 (1981).
170. Id. § 134.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. § 137.
Halliburton Co. v. District Court, 525 P.2d 628, 630 (Okla. 1974).
See supra note 149.
See CLARK, supra note 8, at ch. 9, § A.
12 OKLA. STAT. § 100 (1981).
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Appendix 1
Venue Provisions for Particular Transitory
Actions (In Addition to the Basic Rule)

Title Section
2
3-90
10

5

10
10
12

82
92
133(1)

12

133(3)

12

141

12

142

12

1272.1

12 1600.11(b)
52
324.4
52

529

52

540(C)

58

5(l)

58
58

10,761
911

58

942

60

175.23(B)

79

86

Subject
Negligence of an Oklahoma
governmental entity regarding pesticides
Grandparent's child visitation rights
Paternity determination
Confer majority rights
Recovery of a fine, forfeiture or penalty imposed by
statute
Official bond of a public
officer
Use of a motor vehicle or
boat
Debt, open account, or contract for goods or services
Divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance
Alimony or child support
Bond of a State Fuel Inspector
Agricultural use of natural
gas
Payment of oil and gas
proceeds
Probate of will or grant of
letters testamentary or of
administration
Guardianship of minor
Terminate a life estate or
joint tenancy in real
property
Issuance of letters testamentary or of administration for a missing person
Interpretation of trust
provisions
Unfair competition

County
Cause of action arose
Residence of person with
child custody
Residence of child's mother
Minor's residence
Cause of action arose
Cause of action arose
Damages sustained
Debt contracted
Plaintiff's residence
Plaintiff's residence
Cause of action arose or
injury occurred
Gas well or pipeline located
Well located
Decedent's residence
Minor's residence
Property located
Decedent's residence
Decedent's residence
Property located
Trustee's residence

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983

Damages sustained

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:643

Appendix 2
Venue Provisions for Particular Defendants in
Transitory Actions
Title
12

Section
137

12

187(c)

Motor vehicle owner
or driver
Boat owner or driver
Decedents, probate

47

400

63
58

816
5, 6

Minors, guardianship
Party to arbitration
contract
Polygraph examiner

58
15

761,861
816

59

1461(A)

Domestic corporations

12

134

Business associations
and trusts
Foreign corporations

12

182

art. 9,
Const.

43

12

137

18

471

12

137

Particular Defendants
Nonresidents (in general)

Insurance
Government entities
Public officers
Municipal corporations
(cities)
Administrative agencies
(in general)

12
12
75
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County
Defendant found
Property located
Debts owing
Cause of action arose
Plaintiff's residence
Damages sustained
Plaintiff's residence
Damages sustained
Decedent's property
located
Minor's property located
Place of business
(if none, any county)
Cause of action arose
Plaintiff's residence
Principal place of business
Principal officer's residence or where served
Cause of action arose
Same as domestic
corporations
Cause of action arose
Plaintiff's residence
Service agent found
Same as for nonresidents
in general (§ 137)
Plaintiff's residence
Service agent found
Principal place of
business
Property located
Same as Const.,
art. 9, § 43

Cause of action arose
Same as domestic
corporation
306, 318(2) Plaintiff's residence
Property or rights
affected
133(2)
134
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Title
Particular Defendants
Police Pension and Retire- 11
ment Board appeals
47
Department of Public
47
Safety (driver's license
decisions)
59
Board of Chiropractic
Examiners appeals
60
Tax Commission
unclaimed property)
69
Turnpike Authority

Public Employees Retirement System
Grand River Dam
Authority
Insurance and surety
companies (in general)
Surety company

74

Unauthorized insurance
For police and fire
vehicles
For state vehicles

36
11
47

Transportation companies

12

Turnpike companies

47
12

82
12
18

Section
50-129

County
Oklahoma County

6-211(a),(b) Plaintiffs residence
6-211(c) Offense committed
(nonresident)
164e
Plaintiff's residence
Decision made
676
Plaintiff's residence
Oklahoma County
1705(d) Plaintiff's residence
Cause of action arose
Principal office
Oklahoma County
904(1)
Cause of action arose
Principal office
Same as domestic
134
corporations
485
Office located
Principal's residence
Bond filed or returnable
6103(G)(4) Plaintiff's residence
8620)

23-104 Cause of action arose
157.1, 157.4 Plaintiff's residence
158.1
Cause of action arose
Principal officer's or
135
service agent's
residence
Cause of action arose
Company's lines pass
173
Cause of action arose
Turnpike road passes
136
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